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I. INTRODUCTION
November 15, 1994 marked the beginning of the imposition of
tough new federally-mandated responsibilities on many employers
across the United States. On that day, employers in areas with severe or
extreme air pollution problems were required to begin programs to
reduce the number of their employees who drive to work. These pro-
grams must meet statutory goals by November 15, 1996,1 or the targeted
employers will face fines and possible criminal penalties.2
A provision of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 19903 requires
employers of over one hundred employees in eleven designated states to
comply with mandatory trip-reduction programs for commuting employ-
ees.4 According to Congress, these programs can be achieved in a man-
1. See Caryn A. McBride, The Federal Clean Air Act. Rxfor Environment-or Plague on
Area Economy?, FAIRFIELD COUNTY Bus. J., Nov. 15, 1993, at 1; Stephen L. Kass & Michael B.
Gerrard, Implementation of the Clean Air Act in New York, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 24, 1993, at 3; Patty
Reinert, Burdens of Clean Air Act Fall on Business, Under State Regs, WARFIELD'S Bus. REc.,
June 25, 1993, at 3; Paul H. Schneider & Jody V. Wilson, Clean Air Act Amendments Will Change
Commuting, N.J. LAW., May 10, 1993, at 16.
2. Wade Lambert, Business Must Wean Workers From Their Cars, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4,
1993, at B I.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq. (1990).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 751 la(d)(1)(B) (1990).
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ner that will enhance mobility5 and not cost an unreasonable amount of
money to implement.6
This newly-implemented federal requirement, that affects about
28,000 companies and 12 million employees, 7 raises many important
legal questions. First, there exists a real possibility of increased
employer liability.' "Because company-mandated travel arrangements
could be seen as an extension of the workplace, companies could face
lawsuits over traffic accidents or even sexual harassment in a car pool."9
Second, compliance with the provisions is likely to be difficult for the
employer because employees may resist it as a restriction of their per-
sonal freedom. Third, the provision makes the employer responsible for
the off-duty actions of its employees by fining the employer if the
employee does not comply with programs reducing commuting hours.
Finally, the costs imposed on employers by this provision are arguably
disproportionate to the employers' contribution to the pollution problem
in major cities, and compliance may have little positive impact on the
overall air pollution in this country.
It is beyond doubt that areas of the United States are facing severe
air pollution problems and that a solution is desperately needed. How-
ever, it is less than clear that the employer trip-reduction programs will
be a workable or meaningful solution to the problem.
II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990
Signed into law by President Johnson in 1963, the Clean Air Act
was the first modem environmental law to be enacted.'0 As originally
drafted, the Act was meant to combat the growing problem of air pollu-
tion, primarily in urban areas of the country." The Clean Air Act has
been amended numerous times, and the 1990 amendments were passed
in response to the perceived failures of the earlier amendments.1 2
In amending Title I of the Act, Congress recognized that the United
States faced serious air pollution problems arising, in large part, from
5. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 13 (1989) (enacted), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3399.
6. Signing Statement by President George Bush upon Signing S. 1630, 26 Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents 1824 (Nov. 19, 1990) [hereinafter Signing Statement].
7. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated these numbers. Laura M.
Litvan, Clean Air Act's Car-Pool Mandate, NATION'S Bus., Apr., 1994, at 36.
8. See, e.g., David Ibata, Showers, Raffle Tickets are Ways I Firm Tries to Alter
Commuting, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 31, 1993, at I1.
9. Lambert, supra note 2, at B 1.
10. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 5, at 1, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3387.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(1)-(4) (1977).
12. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3389; see also 136
CONG. REc. S17232 (Oct. 2, 1990).
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the increasing use of automobiles. 13 Congress, concerned that a major-
ity of Americans were breathing air that did not meet federal air quality
standards,' 4 realized that the three major air pollutants contributing to
health problems in the country-ozone, carbon monoxide, and particu-
late matter-were produced by motor vehicles.' 5 Studies presented to
the Senate showed that the health-based air quality standards set by the
1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act could not alleviate the growing
air pollution problems.' 6
The goal of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments was to protect
and enhance the quality of the nation's air resources. 17 Three reasons
underlay this goal: (1) the protection of the public health by reducing
the levels of unhealthful pollutants in the air; (2) the reduction of health
care costs that had risen to over $40 billion per year just for the treat-
ment of ailments caused by exposure to air pollution; and (3) the reduc-
tion of welfare costs that were rising as air pollution began to cause
extensive damage to many types of vegetation and crops.' 8
The amendments launched a partnership between the state and fed-
eral government to help solve the problem.' 9 Congress acknowledged
that "air pollution recognizes no state or international borders,' 20 but
added that "air pollution prevention ... and air pollution control at its
source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments.'
As in the earlier amendments, the 1990 plan required that the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) set nationally uniform air quality stan-
dards and declared that states, with the agency's assistance, are
responsible for meeting such standards.22 States are required to develop
state implementation plans (SIPs), outlining their plans to ensure com-
pliance with the EPA's standards, and to submit them to the EPA for
23review.
Congress also realized that the 1970 and 1977 amendments failed
to achieve healthy air because many of the requirements of the amend-
ments were not being met.24 Furthermore, there were problems with
13. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 5, at 1, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3387; see also 136
CONG. REc. S17232, 17233 (Oct. 2, 1990).
14. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3388.
15. Id. at 6-7, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3391-3393.
16. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3389.
17. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3391.
18. Id. at 6-9, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3392-3395; see also 136 CONG. REc. H251 1,
2514-2515 (May 21, 1990).
19. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 5, at 9, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3395.
20. Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (1990).
22. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 5, at 9, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3395.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3396.
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understatements of emissions in state reports, inadequacies in predic-
tions of ambient air quality, failures of states to implement some of the
controls they had committed to in their SIPs, and failures of the EPA to
require additional controls when the attainment deadlines were not being
met.25 As a result, Congress decided the 1990 amendments would be a
"new and more aggressive control program. "26
To combat these problems, Congress focused on a "specific incre-
mental progress"'27 toward air pollution reduction goals in the 1990
Amendments. To help ensure compliance, Congress classified areas
according to the severity of their air pollution problems and stepped up
the control mechanisms of the Act.28
Foremost in Congress' findings was that motor vehicles were the
single largest source of ozone and carbon monoxide pollution.29 Studies
indicated that merely controlling the pollution each car emits could not
reduce or avoid increases in vehicle pollution; the use of the car had to
be examined as well, because growth in vehicle miles travelled
("VMT")30 threatened to overwhelm what could be achieved through the
emissions standards outlined in other parts of the amendments. 3' Propo-
nents of the 1990 amendments urged that pollution could be reduced if
fewer vehicle trips took place in polluted and congested urban and sub-
urban areas.32 As a result, Title I of the amended act contains several
provisions meant "to encourage State and local governments, employers
and drivers to plan ahead to reduce vehicle use while maintaining-and
in some cases where congestion is a serious problem actually enhanc-
ing-mobility. 33
The EPA administrator, pursuant to section 107(f)(1) of the
amended act, must designate all areas of the country in terms of their air
pollution problems.34 An area that does not either meet the standard or
contributes pollution to another area that does not meet the standard is to
25. Id. at 11-12, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3397-3398.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3398.
28. Id. at 13-14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3399.
29. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3399; see also 136 CONG. REC. S17232,
17233 (Oct. 2, 1990); 136 CONG. REC. H2511, 2518 (May 21, 1990).
30. VMT is a measure of the extent of motor vehicle operation. S. REa. No. 228, supra note
5, at 13, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3405. The figure represents the total miles driven by
the total number of cars in the area.
31. Id. at 19, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3405.
32. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3399; see also 136 CONG. REc. H2511, 2521
(May 21, 1990).





be designated a "nonattainment" area." Proponents of the amendments
linked the nonattainment problem in the most severely polluted cities to
total auto use, and projected that future increases in auto use (measured
in VMT) would cause most of the emission growth in those cities.36
New Subpart 2 of the Act classifies ozone nonattainment areas into
categories depending on the degree to which they exceed the ambient air
quality standards for ozone, and prescribes deadlines for attaining the
standards and requirements applicable to each category.37 These areas
are defined as moderate, serious, severe, and extreme. 38 Severe areas39
exceed the standards by more than 50% but no more than 120%, while
extreme areas40 exceed the standards by more than 120%. 4"
Congress updated the transportation control measures in the revised
section 108 of the act to reduce VMT and improve traffic flow.4 2 This
was a critical problem because the VMT nationwide was projected to
increase cumulatively by 40-60% between 1989 and 2005. 43 Congress
wanted to reduce future VMT growth while providing enhanced mobil-
ity to serve increasing travel demands. 44 The Senate bill focused on
"transportation planning toward optimum use of all potential alternatives
to the single occupancy vehicle, ranging from highway facilities dedi-
cated to moving high occupancy vehicles, to providing carpool, vanpool
services and improved public transit. 45
The main objective of the Senate bill was to "promote the adoption
and implementation of policies to reduce vehicle use in nonattainment
areas. ' 4 6  Proponents of the bill hoped that it would "encourage
medium- and long-term planning for achieving and maintaining air qual-
ity standards. 47 Upon signing this bill into law, President Bush stated
35. Id. at 13-14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3399-3400.
36. Id. at 26, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3412.
37. Id. at 30-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3416-3417.
38. Id.
39. The areas designated by the Clean Air Act of 1990 as "severe" are: "Baltimore, MD;
Chicago-Gary-Lake County, IL-IN-WI; Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX; Milwaukee-Racine,
WI; Muskegon, MI; New York-New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT; Philadelphia-Wilmington-
Trenton, PA-NJ-DE-MD; San Diego, CA." Id. at 35, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3421.
Thus, eleven states are targeted: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. Lambert, supra note 2, at BI.
40. Only one area in the United States was designated as "extreme": Los-Angeles-Anaheim-
Riverside, CA. Id.
41. Id. at 31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3417.
42. Id. at 18, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3404.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 18-19, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3404-3405.
45. Id. at 19, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3405.
46. Id. at 27, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3413.
47. Id. at 28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3414.
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that it "achieves my environmental goals at an acceptable cost."'4 8 He
appreciated the Act's reliance on the market to reconcile the environ-
ment and the economy.49
The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act are ambitious and seek
to cure a pervasive problem. However, it is doubtful that the dual Con-
gressional policies behind the Clean Air Amendments of 1990-a
reduction of VMT and enhanced mobility-can actually be achieved by
the current statutory framework. Furthermore, the President's prediction
that these programs can be effectuated at an acceptable cost has yet to be
borne out.
III. EMPLOYER TRIP-REDUCTION PROGRAMS
One little-recognized, but important addition to the Clean Air Act
in the 1990 amendments is section 751la(d)(1)(b). This section man-
dates the creation of what has come to be known as "Employer Trip-
Reduction Programs" 50 that employers must implement in ozone or car-
bon monoxide areas designated as "severe" or "extreme."''1 The
employer trip-reduction mandate basically requires that employers of
100 or more employees in each designated area implement programs to
increase average vehicle occupancy of commuting trips by employees
"by not less than 25 percent above the average vehicle occupancy for all
such trips in the area at the time the revision is submitted. ' 52 In addi-
tion, employers of fewer than 100 employees may be in danger of hav-
ing this section of the Act apply to them as well.5 3
The legislative history of this provision shows that Congress
intended to reduce VMT by decreasing "both the number of vehicles on
the road during rush hours and the time the remaining cars spend idling
48. Signing Statement, supra note 6.
49. Id.
50. These programs are also known as "employee commute options." Janet Naylor, Business
Groups Oppose Plan to Cut Employee Commuting, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at C4.
51. See supra notes 39 & 40; see also Catherine Romano, Business Copes with the Clean Air
Conundrum; Employee Trip Reduction Provision of the 1990 Clean Air Act, MGMT. REv., Feb.,
1994, at 34.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 751 la(d)(1)(B) (1990); see also Kass & Gerrard, supra note 1, at 3; David
Ibata, Employers Get Commuter-Plan Reprieve, CHi. TRIB., July 28, 1993, at 1; Joseph J.
McGovern, Does ETRP Equal Mandatory Car Pools?, Focus, Dec. 1, 1992, at 11.
53. The federal regulations apply to companies with 100 or more employees, but the
issue should also concern smaller firms. Not only do states have authority to extend
the requirements of the law to firms with fewer than 100 workers, it is also not
uncommon for Congress to later reduce original numerical thresholds of
government mandates.
Litvan, supra note 7, at 36. The state of California actually extended the mandate to employers of
50 employees or less, but after opposition from smaller firms, the state legislature passed a bill
prohibiting such action until 1996. Id.
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or operating at inefficient low speeds, and thereby to reduce emissions
of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide [and other materials]." 54 In order to
implement such programs, designated employers in nonattainment areas
must "provide services, facilities or incentives to encourage employees
to share commuting trips."" These programs "put the onus on compa-
nies to encourage the use of car-pooling, mass transit, and company-
"156arranged transportation ....
Employers have been encouraged to arrange employee car pools,
provide employer van pool services, furnish passes for public transporta-
tion, offer prizes as incentives for compliance, and allow employee
"telecommuting. 57 Other possible actions by employers to ensure com-
pliance may include reducing the number of parking spaces at the work-
place or providing showers at the worksite for bikers or walkers. 8
Employers may even try changing employee work schedules to unusual
times because the mandates of the Employer Trip-Reduction Programs
are primarily concerned with rush-hour ozone levels.5 9
The Senate bill requires the designated states to submit SIP revi-
sions mandating that the statutorily prescribed employers achieve no less
than a 25 percent improvement in commuting vehicle occupancy above
a baseline that is the areawide average for all such trips.6" This baseline
would vary, depending on the availability of mass transit to the employ-
ees. For example, "the baseline vehicle occupancy rate for center city
trips where transit is more readily available might be 1.7 passengers per
vehicle while for a suburban area, the baseline rate might be only 1.1 or
1.2." Thus, employers in suburban areas would not be required to
meet goals as ambitious as those imposed upon their urban counterparts.
54. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 5, at 45, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3431.
55. Id.
56. Lambert, supra note 2, at B I; see also Dale D. Buss, Dealers Apprehensive Over Ride-
Sharing Law, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Jan. 10, 1994; McBride, supra note 1, at 1; lbata, supra note
52, at 1.
57. Lewis Goldshore, DOTProposing Employer Trip Reduction Programs, N.J. L.J., June 28,
1993, at 6.
58. Litvan, supra note 7, at 36; see also Pat Paquette, We Stopped Watering our Lawns
During the Draught, But.. ., CAL. J., Sept. 1, 1993.
59. See, e.g., Glenn L. Unterberger, Commuting Regulated for Business, Law Firms; New Pa.
Environmental Program Targets 100-Employee Companies, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 11,
1994, at 9; Dale D. Buss, A Tough Act to Follow: Ask Not for Whom the Regulatory Bell Tolls; If
You Employ More than 100 People, it Tolls for You, CORP. REP. Wis., July, 1993, at 8; Reinert,
supra note 1, at 3; Schneider & Wilson, supra note 1, at 16; Jennifer Liebrum, Laws May Wean
Houston Drivers From Their Cars; 22 Area Firms Seek Ways to Cut Down Commuting, HouSTON
CHRON., May 5, 1993, at A25.
60. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 5, at 45, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3431.
61 Id.
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This improvement must be attained by November, 1996.62 A writ-
ten plan detailing how this goal will be met must have been submitted to
the state Department of Transportation by these employers by November
15, 1994, at which time the employers must also have begun implement-
ing the plan.63
Relying on one particular California experiment, the Senate bill
stressed not only that such programs can be successful, but also that
"employer ridership programs appear to make economic as well as envi-
ronmental sense."'' The bill noted that trip reduction programs can
result in savings to employers who subsidize parking, because they will
be paying for fewer employee parking spaces.65 The bill further noted
that these programs also result in savings to employees because of
reduction in car care expenses and gasoline.66 However, many other
costs and liabilities that need to be taken into consideration when evalu-
ating the cost effectiveness of section 751 la(d)(1)(B) may serve to
reduce or even negate any documented savings.6 7
This paper takes the position that the costs of complying with the
employer trip-reduction programs will far exceed their ultimate benefits
in reducing air pollution, and that Congress' goal of increasing mobility
is unobtainable under the current statutory scheme. Further, this paper
suggests alternative solutions to the current air pollution problem that
may prove to be less expensive, easier to administer, and more likely to
achieve the goals set by Congress.
IV. POSSIBLE INCREASED EMPLOYER LIABILITY
A significant danger inherent in these mandatory employer trip-
reduction programs is that the implementation of company-sponsored
travel arrangements 68 may be interpreted by courts as an expansion of
62. See McBride, supra note 1, at 1; Kass & Gerrard, supra note 1, at 3; Reinert, supra note
1, at 3; Schneider & Wilson, supra note 1, at 16.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 7511 a(d)(1)(B) (1990); see also Kass & Gerrard, supra note 1, at 3; Clean
Air Regulations Approved by Environmental Quality Board, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 21, 1993;
LeAnn Spencer, Share the Ride? Few Would Go Along, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 1993, at 1;
Goldshore, supra note 57, at 6; Paul H. Schneider, US. Clean Air Act Amendments Bring New
Regulations, N.J. LAW., Apr. 12, 1993, at 19.
64. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 5, at 46, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3432.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. For example, "possible conflicts with unions if employers try to use collectively
bargained paid parking as an incentive or disincentive" may become a costly situation for
employers. Barbara Presley Noble, At Work; Getting Them There is Half the Job, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1993, § 3, at 25.
68. Such arrangements might include the use of transit systems, use of employer-provided
van pools, formation of employee car pools, or even employer-paid taxicab rides home during odd
work hours. See Goldshore, supra note 57.
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the workplace. If this is the case, employers or their insurance compa-
nies could potentially be held liable for incidents such as employee inju-
ries sustained in traffic accidents, injuries caused to third parties by
commuting employees, or sexual harassment of an employee in a com-
pany-sponsored mode of transportation.69
This potential liability would result in increased costs for the
affected employers. Whether these costs are "acceptable" as the Presi-
dent concluded they would be, depends on how the courts interpret the
problem and how liberally damages are awarded. If history is any indi-
cation, however, and the commute is viewed as an expansion of the
workplace, employers are likely to bear the burden of most costs
incurred during an employer-mandated employee commute.
A. Increased Employer Liability Pursuant to Other Federal Statutes:
Expansion of the Workplace
Such an expansion of what the workplace legally encompasses
would hardly be novel. In many instances, federal statutes' require-
ments for employers have translated into increased employer liability
and increased employer costs. The Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA),70 is one such statute. For example, the case of Empey v. Grand
Trunk Western R.R. Co." held that, for the purpose of FELA, an
employee is within the scope of his employment if he is injured while
availing himself of employer-provided housing.72 In Empey, an
employee of the railroad company was transported to a motel by the
railroad company and he stayed there before starting his next work
assignment,73 as required by the Federal Hours of Service Act.74 The
Act provided that railroad employees could only work twelve consecu-
tive hours before they were required to rest for ten hours; the statute also
required that railroad employers provide rooms for their off-duty train
crew.75 The employer in Empey had a contract with a certain hotel in
this city, and although the employees were not required to stay at that
particular hotel, if they chose to stay at another facility, it would be at
their own expense.76 Empey stepped out of his shower at the employer-
suggested hotel, slipped in a puddle of water, and injured his back-a
broken latch on the shower door had permitted the leakage onto the
69. Lambert, supra note 2, at BI; see also Noble, supra note 67, at 25.
70. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et. seq. (1986).
71. 869 F.2d 293 (6th Cir. 1989).
72. Empey v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 869 F.2d 293, 295 (6th Cir. 1989).
73. Id. at 294.
74. 45 U.S.C. § 61 et. seq. (1982).
75. Empey v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 869 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1989).
76. Id.
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floor.77 The court held that Empey was within the scope of his employ-
ment with the railroad when he fell at the hotel, and that any negligence
of the hotel would be imputed to the employer-railroad pursuant to
FELA.78
In another FELA case, Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway
Co.,7 9 an employer was held liable under FELA for its employee's inju-
ries sustained in a cafeteria provided by the employer. Though the
employee was not required to eat in the cafeteria, it was restricted to
employees, and their guests.80 The court held the employer liable for the
employee's injuries because the cafeteria enhanced the possibility of
increased productivity by the employees, and because the employer
received benefits from the cafeteria in that the cafeteria improved
employee morale and enabled employees to return from lunch to work
on time.81 Similarly, the court in Holman v. American Automobile
Insurance Co.,82 relying on the same rationale used in Moore, held an
employer liable for the injuries one of its employees sustained in the
employer-provided cafeteria.8 3
By analogy to these cases, it is clear that the employer trip-reduc-
tion programs could also expand the scope of employer liability to
include off-worksite injuries. Following the "encouragement of use"
analysis of Empey, it is clear that, to comply with the Clean Air Act,
employers will persuade their employees to utilize alternative methods
of getting to work. The "benefit to employer" reasoning of Moore and
Holman is also important; employee compliance with the trip-reduction
programs would benefit their employers by saving thousands of dollars
in noncompliance fines.8 4
In a similar vein, the FELA case of Carney v. Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie R.R. Co.85 held that the employer was liable for the injuries an
employee sustained when he fell from a negligently maintained bed
while staying at the local YMCA. The employer in Carney had
arranged for, but did not require, its employees to stay at the YMCA.86
The court stated that the employee's "residence and lodging at the
YMCA was part of the operational activities of the railroad. '8 7 A later
77. Id.
78. Id. at 295.
79. 649 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1981).
80. Id. at 1010.
81. Id.
82. 39 S.E.2d 850 (Ga. 1946).
83. Id. at 854.
84. See infra section VII.
85. 316 F.2d 277 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 814 (1963).
86. Id. at 279.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 49:827
CLEAN AIR ACT
case decided under the federal Jones Act8 8 clarified the types of actions
that would constitute "operational activities." The Supreme Court, in
Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 9 held that a shipowner/employer's use of cab
transportation to take its employees to the United States Consul's office,
as required by law, constituted part of its operational activities, render-
ing the employer liable for injuries sustained by the employees in an
accident involving a cab in which they were passengers. 90
Employer trip-reduction programs could be seen as falling within
the "operational activities" of the company, because federal law requires
that they be implemented as part of company policy. According to Car-
ney and Hopson, this would subject the employer to increased liability
for employee injuries occurring outside of the traditionally defined
worksite. If the workplace is expanded in this way, to include employee
commuting, employers could be legally liable for commuting accidents
or incidents. Certainly, then, there is a very real danger to employers in
following the dictates of section 751 la(d)(1)(B) of the Clean Air Act-
they could be held liable for any harm that befalls their employees while
those employees commute to or from work.
Other FELA cases discussing employer liability for off-workplace
employee injuries seem to place emphasis on some degree of employer
control over the employee's activity. For example, in Duffield v. Marra,
Inc.," an employee slipped in the parking lot of a motel in which he was
staying at his employer's expense. Although the employee was not "on
the job" at the time of the accident, the court held that "an employee acts
within the scope of his employment not only when he performs actual
work, but also when he is engaged in acts incidental to his employ-
ment. '92 In contrast to the previous cases, the employer arranged for the
88. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
89. 383 U.S. 262 (1966).
90. Id. at 264; see also Penn Central Corp. v. Checker Cab Co., 488 F. Supp. 1225, 1228
(E.D. Mich. 1980) (another case decided under the FELA which held that "where a railroad
utilizes cab services to transport its employees, these services can constitute an operational
activity of the railroad, thus rendering the railroad liable for injuries sustained by the employees in
the course of the cab transportation.").
91. 520 N.E.2d 938 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
92. Id. at 943 (citing Fowler v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 638 F.2d 17, 20 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Although "incidental to employment" is a term of art that normally is construed to mean
"incidental to the production activities of a company," other courts have construed phrases such as
this literally. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 736 (1989);
Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children and Adults v. Playboy Enter., 815 F.2d 323, 334 (5th Cir.
1987) (both construing phrase "work for hire"). There is no reason to think that the courts may
not interpret this phrase literally as well. The RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1982 ed.)
defines "incidental" as meaning "happening in conjunction with something else." Certainly, then,
a literal interpretation of the phrase "incidental to employment" would include employee
commutes to work that conformed to employer requests.
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employee to stay at the motel in order to keep the employee close to the
worksite so that he could be called into work quickly.
The issue of employer control was also important in Mostyn v. Del-
aware, L. & W. R. Co.93 There, an employee who had left his railroad
bunk car because it was infested with vermin was injured as he slept by
the side of the tracks. In spite of the fact that the employee was not
required to sleep in the bunk car (which he did at his own expense), and
could have slept in town as other workmen did, the court held that the
employee was within the scope of his employment at the time of the
accident, and held his employer liable for the injury.94 The court stated
that "when a railroad provides shelter or food or both for its employees,
and they are using the accommodations so provided to prepare them-
selves for their work, they must be regarded as in [the employer's]
'employ.' -95
In Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson,96 a railroad employee was
injured as he commuted from home to work on his employer's com-
muter train. Even though the employee was on the employer's premises
and had been given a pass to ride the train by the employer, the court
held that the employee was not within the scope of his employment at
the time of the injury. The court based its holding on the fact that the
employee was not required to use the employer's train to get to work-
the employer had given the employee the pass merely as a "perk" and
not as a request to use this particular means of transportation. The
employee "could have taken one of any number of other routes, trains,
or means of transportation to go from his home to work. ' 9 7 Similarly, in
Getty v. Boston and Maine Corp.,98 a railroad employee who slipped in
a railroad station parking lot as he walked to board a commuter train to
work argued that he was within the scope of his employment because a
heavy snowstorm made other forms of transportation impractical and, in
effect, compelled him to take the train to work. However, the court held
that there was no "employer compulsion" to take the train, and thus the
employer was not liable for the employee's injuries.9 9 The court further
noted that
[t]he sort of necessity referred to in Metropolitan Coal must stem
more directly from a specific requirement of his job or a specific
understanding as to his mode of travel .... [A]bsent circumstances
93. 160 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1947).
94. Id. at 17-18.
95. Id.
96. 265 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1959).
97. Id. at 178.
98. 505 F.2d 1226 (1st Cir. 1974).
99. Id. at 1228.
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indicating a special arrangement with one's employer, subjective
conditions resulting from employee choices of where to live and how
to travel are insufficiently related to employment to determine the
coverage of the federal statute."'100
Unlike transportation provided under federally mandated employer trip-
reduction programs, in these cases the employers did not compel their
employees to use a specific form of transportation, nor did the employ-
ees' use of the transportation provide any benefit to their employers.
The Clean Air Act's mandatory employer trip-reduction programs
clearly involve a degree of employer control and compulsion. Employ-
ers will strongly encourage employees to use alternative means of get-
ting to work each day, and some will provide other methods of
transportation to their employees. In addition, employers may reduce
the number of parking spaces at the worksite or begin charging employ-
ees for the use of parking spaces. And finally, employers will be
required to poll their employees periodically to learn whether or not the
employees are complying with the program's mandates.
Employers' compliance with other federal statutes, such as the
FELA and the Jones Act, has expanded both the traditionally recognized
workplace and employer liability when the employer's compliance with
the federal requirements: (1) entails encouraging the employee to use
certain facilities or means of transportation; (2) clearly benefits the
employer; (3) is part of the employer's operational activities; or (4)
involves some degree of employer control. Because the Clean Air Act's
mandate of employer trip-reduction programs would encompass all four
of these elements, it seems clear that a similar expansion of the defini-
tion of the workplace and of employer liability could follow the Clean
Air Act's requirements.
B. Employees Commuting To and From Work under an Employer's
Trip-Reduction Program: Is This an Exception to the
"Going and Coming" Doctrine?
One rule of law explicitly excludes incidents during a commute
from the employer's liability, with certain exceptions. The "going and
coming" doctrine normally provides that an employee commuting to or
from his workplace is not acting within the scope of his employment,
and thus an employer would not be liable under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior to either employees or to third parties for incidents stem-
ming from employees' commutes to work.10 Further, under the same
100. Id. at 1227-28 (emphasis added).
101. See, e.g., Konradi v. United States, 919 F.2d 1207, 1209 (7th Cir. 1990); Weiss v.
Culpepper, 281 So. 2d 372, 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Pyne v. Witmer, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1307 (11.
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doctrine, injuries to an employee that occur while the employee travels
to or from work are generally not compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act.10 2 The rationale behind this rule is that the risks to
which the employees are exposed while travelling to and from work are
shared by society as a whole and do not normally arise as a result of the
work of employers. 03
There are, however, several exceptions to the going and coming
rule. The four most widely approved exceptions are as follows:
(1) The Claimant's employment contract includes transportation to
and from work or payment therefor;
(2) The Claimant has no fixed place of work or serves as a travelling
salesperson;
(3) The Claimant is on a special mission for the employer; or
(4) Special circumstances are such that Claimant was furthering the
business of the employer."
Exceptions one and four are especially relevant to the possibility of
increased employer liability under section 751 la(d)(1)(B) of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990.
The first exception, known as the "wage payment or travel excep-
tion' 0 5 to the "going and coming" rule, provides that if a workers' com-
pensation applicant were being paid for the time he travelled to or from
work, his injury would be compensable.' 0 6 For example, an employee
paid from the time he left home, rather than from the time he arrived at
work, would be compensated under workers' compensation law for inju-
ries sustained during the commute to work. In effect, the employee
1989); Biel, Inc. v. Kirsch, 161 N.E.2d 617, 618 (Ind. 1959); Roger v. Dufrene, 553 So. 2d 1106,
1108 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
102. See, e.g., Hughes v. Decatur General Hosp., 514 So. 2d 935, 937 (Ala. 1987); Cook v.
A.H. Davis & Son, Inc., 567 A.2d 29, 30 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Hall v. DeFalco, 533 N.E.2d 448,
452 (II. App. Ct. 1988); Hughes v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 552 So. 2d 717, 719 (La. Ct. App.
1989); Manzo v. Amalgamated Indus. Union Local 76B, 575 A.2d 903, 904 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1990); Fine v. S.M.C. Microsystems Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (N.Y. 1990); Brown v.
Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Liken Employment Nursing Serv.), 588 A.2d 1014, 1016 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991); Septa v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Scott), 582 A.2d 421, 422 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990); Kear v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Fairman Drilling Co.), 517 A.2d 586,
588 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986); Evans v. Illinois Employers Ins. of Wausau, 790 S.W.2d 302, 304
(Tex. 1990).
103. Evans, 790 S.W.2d at 305.
104. See, e.g., Mahon v. Reilly's Radio Cabs, Inc., 513 A.2d 367, 370 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1986); Brown v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Liken Employment Nursing Serv.), 588
A.2d 1014, 1016 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); Septa v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Scott), 582
A.2d 421 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990); Kear v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Fairman Drilling Co.),
517 A.2d 586, 588 n.1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
105. See Baroid v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 121 Cal. App. 3d 558, 566 (1981) (citations
omitted).
106. See also Manzo v. Amalgamated Indus. Union Local 76B, 575 A.2d 903, 904 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990).
[Vol. 49:827
CLEAN AIR ACT
would be considered to have been acting within the scope of his employ-
ment during such a commute.107
Such an exception could logically be expanded to include some
forms of employer compliance with the employer trip-reduction pro-
grams. For example, an employer that compensated employees for
carpooling in their own cars, 10 8 provided passes for mass transit, or
awarded complying employees with prizes or cash bonuses, could be
viewed as paying the employee for his travel time. Further, an employer
that conditioned employment on compliance with the trip-reduction pro-
grams' °9 could be seen as providing a bonus of continued employment
to those employees who comply.
However, the cases in this area are quick to point out that an
employer's mere provision of free transportation for its employees is not
enough to bring the employees' travel to and from work within the scope
of employment. 10 Rather, there must be some benefit to the employer
as a result of the provision of employee transportation."' An employer
furnishing transportation to its employees in conjunction with a feder-
ally-mandated trip reduction program would certainly receive a benefit
from this action-it would escape the high fines levied against employ-
ers for noncompliance with the act." 2 Thus, there exists a real danger of
increased employer liability in this area.
The final exception to the "going and coming" doctrine applies
when the employee is furthering the business of the employer by means
of his travel. Under the "furtherance of employer's business" excep-
tion, 1 13 off-premise injuries are only compensable if, at the time of the
injury, the employee is actually engaged in the furtherance of the
employer's business activities. 1 4
107. Id.; see also Baroid, 121 Cal. App.3d at 566, n.2 (1981) (citations omitted). This idea
seems to stem from the common law, which held that "where, as an incident of the employment,
the master is transporting the servant to or from his work, the servant is constructively within the
scope of his employment, and the master owes him a duty of care." 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and
Servant, § 185 (1970).
108. See, e.g., Septa, 582 A.2d at 422; Kear, 517 A.2d at 588.
109. See infra section VI.
110. See Mahon v. Reilly's Radio Cabs, Inc., 513 A.2d 367, 370 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1986).
111. Id. at 371.
112. See infra section VII.
113. Brown v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Liken Employment Nursing Serv.), 588 A.2d
1014, 1016 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
114. The reasons behind this exception are clear:
[t]he risks which are generated by an employee's activities while serving his
employer's interests are properly allocated to the employer as a cost of engaging in
the enterprise .... [But when the employer] had only a marginal relationship with
the act which generated the risk and did not benefit by it, the purpose of this policy
falls, and the responsibility for preventing the rise is properly allocated to employee.
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An employee's compliance with his employer's trip-reduction pro-
gram plans would save his employer from expensive noncompliance
fines. 15 Further, an employee adhering to the mandates of such pro-
grams would be following his employer's direct orders. These actions
could certainly be interpreted as an employee furthering the business of
his employer, and would, thereby, fall within the final exception to the
"going and coming" doctrine and expand the employer's liability for
incidents occurring during its employees' commutes to and from work.
Thus, an employer who obeys the dictates of section
7511 a(d)(1)(B) and creates a trip-reduction program, if his employees
comply with such a program, may become liable for drastically
increased workers' compensation insurance premiums. 116 Further, if the
injury occurs not to his employee, but to a third person, the employer
will be liable for such injuries, that are not covered by workers' compen-
sation insurance. The resultant costs of either situation promise to
increase employers' expenses radically. These dramatic cost increases
imposed upon a small percentage of air polluters, do not seem to be in
accord with the 1990 Clean Air Act's goal of implementing these pro-
grams at an acceptable cost.
C. Voluntary Employer Commuting Plans and Resultant Employer
Liability
Prior to the Clean Air Act's mandate of trip-reduction programs,
employers in some areas instituted voluntary programs to transport their
employees to and from the workplace from either their homes or from
public transportation facilities." 7 In Hall v. DeFalco,II8 the court held
that an exception to the "going and coming" rule exists where an
employer "provides a means of transportation to or from work or has
done an affirmative act in supplying an employee with something in
connection with going to or coming from work."' '9 In Hall, a manager
of a fast-food restaurant transported employees to and from a public
train station from work on a daily basis in order to improve access to the
workplace and thereby benefit the employer corporation. The court held
that an accident that occurred while the manager was driving one of the
Marcel v. Pool Co., 1992 WL 373646 (E.D.La. 1992).
115. See infra section VII.
116. Workers' compensation, because it is normally an exclusive remedy, is meant to be
interpreted liberally in favor of coverage. See, e.g., Hall v. DeFalco, 533 N.E.2d 448, 452 (II1.
App. Ct. 1988); Mahon, 513 A.2d at 369.
117. Hall, 533 N.E.2d 448; see also Schauder v. Pfeifer, 570 N.Y.S.2d 179 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991).
118. 533 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
119. Id. at 452 (citing Hindler v. Dillbeck, 370 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ill. 1977)); see also Saintida
v. Tyre, 783 F. Supp. 1368, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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employees to the station was an affirmative act within the scope of the
manager's employment, and that the injured employee should recover
workers' compensation. 20
Similarly, in Schauder v. Pfeifer, '2 an employer's voluntary van
pool service created for the benefit of his employees fell within the
expanded definition of the workplace, and as a result the court awarded
workers' compensation to an injured employee. The employer formed a
van pool for transporting its employees to and from work for a monthly
fee, and the driver of the van, an independent contractor, was under the
direct control of the employer. In an accident involving the van during a
commuting trip, an employee was injured. In that case, the court held
that "an employer who assumes, by contract or custom, the responsibil-
ity of transporting its employees must likewise bear the responsibility
for the risks encountered in that transportation."' 22
The law in most jurisdictions is in accord with these cases, holding
that when "the employer provides the worker with transportation, an
accident which occurs during the transportation is considered to have
arisen out of and in the course of employment, rendering it compensable
[under the Workers' Compensation Act]."' 123
When workers' compensation insurance companies pay higher
claims to injured employees, the employers paying the premiums for
such insurance will necessarily be forced to pay higher rates for their
insurance, thus increasing employer costs. Further, the fact that courts
are willing to expand the definition of the workplace for purposes of
workers' compensation claims suggests that courts may also be willing
to alter the definition of the workplace in situations outside of the realm
of workers' compensation. This possibility is one that could deeply
affect employers subject to the requirements of section 751 la(d)(1)(B).
Employers can try to escape the potential increased costs of work-
ers' compensation insurance by choosing methods other than providing
employee transportation to comply with the Clean Air Act's require-
ments. However, even alternative means of compliance may create sig-
nificant increases in employer costs.' 24 Furthermore, because the courts
have been so willing to increase employer liability in the area of work-
ers' compensation, it is plausible that they will expand liability in other
120. Hall, 533 N.E.2d at 452.
121. 570 N.Y.S.2d 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
122. Id. at 180.
123. Saintida, 783 F. Supp. at 1374 (citing Wert v. Tropicana Pools, Inc., 286 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla.
1973)).
124. For example, the options of telecommuting and reduced work weeks often result in
decreased employee production, and reducing employee parking spaces or charging for them may
result in costly conflicts with unions. See infra section VII.
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areas as well. Because worker's compensation can be seen as a potential
limit on liability,1 25 many employers may choose the more easily antici-
pated costs of the workers' compensation insurance over the uncertain
and potentially exorbitant costs imposed by the other methods of com-
pliance with the Clean Air Act mandate. Thus, a large-scale implemen-
tation of transportation-centered plans by employers, with its resultant
increase in worker's compensation insurance rates, is the most likely
outcome.
V. EMPLOYEES' PERCEIVED Loss OF PERSONAL FREEDOM
Employers who try to convince employees to give up their cars will
not be faced with an easy task-"despite public campaigns to get motor-
ists to share rides with co-workers or to use mass transit, commuters
increasingly prefer to drive alone.' 26 Increased use of the auto for com-
muting is connected with the movement of the work force from the city
to the suburbs.'27 Work trips now are frequently linked to other trips,
such as personal errands and picking up children from day care. As a
result, commuting options are often not feasible for employees.12 Driv-
ing alone is simply more convenient. 29 Further, recent history in some
areas has shown a disturbingly rapid rise in vehicle miles driven. 13
0
Employees who now combine many other tasks with their commute to
and from work each day will be severely hampered if forced to commute
in car pools or mass transit. 131 Their mobility will not be "enhanced," as
the Act promises, but, rather, will become more restricted. In fact, this
inevitable decrease in mobility may actually worsen air pollution condi-
tions. Employees who are required to ride from work in multiple-pas-
senger transportation may, after arriving home, hop back into their cars
125. See, e.g., Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 636 (1983); Fontenot v. Awl, Inc., 923 F.2d 1127, 1132 (5th Cir. 1991);
Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
126. David Ibata, Cars Remain Road-Cloggers of Choice, Cm. TRIB., June 17, 1993, at DI; see
also Robert Reinhold, Hard Times Dilute Enthusiasm for Clean-Air Laws, N.Y. TIMES, November
26, 1993, at Al. "[E]mployees are unlikely to change their solo-driving ways." Litvan, supra
note 7, at 36.
127. Ibata, supra note 125, at 1; see also Matthew L. Wald, Companies Encourage Employees
to Carpool, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1993, at BI.
128. Id.
129. Ibata, supra note 125, at 1.
130. "During the 1980s vehicle miles driven in the Chicago area increased by a third while the
region's population increased barely 2 percent." Stephen F. John & Douglas N. Kane, Getting
Serious About Auto Pollution, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1993, at 15.
131. Thus, the employer trip-reduction mandate becomes a quality of life issue. Linda Molnar,
New Rules Nudging Companies to Reduce Employee Commuting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1994,
Section 13NJ, at 1.
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and retrace the miles they just travelled to run errands or pick up their
children.
And although driving a car is not a fundamental right in the United
States,132 many drivers feel they have a divine right to freedom of move-
ment. 133 This is a notion that psychologists say may be "the biggest
hurdle of all" in implementing the employer trip-reduction programs.
134
Employees may balk at compliance with the programs because they feel
as though their personal freedom is infringed upon. 135 " 'This is an issue
where America's love of the automobile and personal freedom will
come face-to-face with the commitment to protect the environment,' "136
and the employer will be thrust into the middle of this dispute.
VI. PROBLEMS CREATED BY EMPLOYER CONTROL OVER EMPLOYEES'
ACTIONS
Another problem inherent in section 751la(d)(1)(B) is that the
mandatory programs will force employers to oversee their employees'
off-duty travelling to and from work. This role will create burdens on
the employer in the forms of both increased costs of monitoring, and in
costs of possible decreased productivity due to declining employee
morale.
Employer trip-reduction regulations in many states impose six pri-
mary requirements onto large employers: (1) the affected employers
must register with the Department of Transportation; (2) each employer
must designate an Employee Transportation Coordinator to administer
the program at each work location with 100 or more employees; (3)
employees must be surveyed periodically to determine their commuting
patterns; (4) the employer must submit to the Department of Transporta-
tion a compliance plan that describes what actions will be taken to
reduce automobile commuting, and the plan's accuracy and likely effi-
132. See, e.g., Lillios v. Justices of the N.H. Dist. Court, 735 F. Supp. 43, 47 (D.C.N.H. 1990);
Ross v. Gunaris, 395 F. Supp. 623, 627 (D.C.Mass. 1975); People v. Peterson, 734 P.2d 118, 122
(Colo. 1987); Ward v. State, 373 S.E.2d 65, 67 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Heying v. State, 515 N.E.2d
1125, 1128-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Skurdal, 767 P.2d 304, 307 (Mont. 1988); State v.
Green, 427 N.W.2d 304, 305 (Neb. 1988); Porter v. Jensen, 390 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Neb. 1986);
State v. Coyle, 470 N.E.2d 457, 458 (Ohio 1984); Commonwealth Dep't of Transp. v. Wysocki,
535 A.2d 77, 78 (Pa. 1987); Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Schaejbe, 687 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Tex.
1985); Smith v. Cox, 609 P.2d 1332, 1333 (Utah 1980).
133. "Automobility is inextricably linked with personal freedom. Attempts to limit mobility
are attacks on freedom." Matt DeLorenzo, There's Room for Fast, Fun Cars in Diet of Social
Responsibility, AUTOWEEK, Dec. 31, 1990, at 11. "Most people feel they have a God-given right
to drive their car. It is going to be a difficult task to change the mindset of employees." Noble,
supra note 67, at 25.
134. Spencer, supra note 63, at 1.
135. Molnar, supra note 131, at 1.
136. Buss, supra note 59, at 8.
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cacy in reducing vehicle trips must be approved by a Department of
Transportation-approved "certifier"; (5) the employer must make good
faith efforts to implement its plan; and (6) the employer must increase
the number of passengers in each vehicle (Average Passenger Occu-
pancy or APO) by not less than 25 percent over the regional average. 13 7
Each of these steps promises to be costly in terms of both its creation
and its administration.
These requirements essentially compel employers to supervise and
administer the heretofore private actions of their employees.138 Not only
must the employers submit plans for employee commuting reduction,
they must also police the employees by surveying them at given inter-
vals to determine if the employees are actually complying. The fact that
a coordinator must be appointed to ensure that the program is being
properly administered compounds the employer-policing role. The
requirement of an employer's "good faith effort" to implement the plan
forces the employer to intrude upon the formerly personal actions of its
employees. Employees who feel that employers are infringing upon
their personal activities too greatly may resent the interference, and this
may decrease employee morale, which often translates into diminished
productivity.' 39
Although companies will be subject to fines for not drawing up
employee trip-reduction plans as required by section 7511 a(d)(1)(B),
"there is no penalty [under the statute] for workers who refuse to cooper-
ate."'140 Thus, employers will bear the responsibility for getting their
workers out of their cars. 14  Employers can "draw from a long list of
137. Schneider & Wilson, supra note 1, at 16; see also Unterberger, supra note 59, at 9. "The
APO is determined by dividing the number of employees by the number of vehicles driven to
work." Romano, supra note 51, at 34. The APO is "the standard for measuring compliance with
trip reduction regulations." Schneider & Wilson, supra note 1, at 16.
138. The employer trip reduction provision "means telling employees their preferred method of
transportation may no longer be acceptable-and even punishing those who drive to work alone."
Romano, supra note 51, at 34.
139. When employees believe their privacy is being violated there is a negative effect on
employee morale and productivity. Ernest Kaltman, Electronic Monitoring of Employees: Issues
& Guidelines, J. SYs. MGMT., June, 1993, at 17. Erosion of morale often goes hand-in-hand with
reduced productivity. Jennifer J. Laabs, Companies Kick the Smoking Habit, PERSONNEL J., Jan.,
1994, at 38; Gail Gilmore, Coping with the Reality of Rightsizing; Seeking Efficiency and
Productivity Gains, RISK MGMT., Jan., 1994, at 43. High employee morale, on the other hand,
often leads to increased productivity. Cindy D. Edmonds, Running a City on a Shoestring,
Vestavia Hill, Alabama, MGMT. ACCT. (USA), Jan., 1994, at 28; Marilyn Citron, Staying Well:
Small Companies have the Most to Gain from Employee Wellness Programs, DETROITER, Oct.,
1993, at 36.
140. Reinhold, supra note 125, at Al. Further, "the law does not allow employers to threaten
employees with 'severe penalties' if they don't (comply]" Jeff Millar, Making a Federal Case,
Right Out of the Blue, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 10, 1994, Outlook Section, at 6.
141. Spencer, supra note 63, at 1.
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possible measures" to get their employees to comply: "eliminating cur-
rent parking subsidies; defraying the cost of mass transit; setting up car
and van pooling and ride-sharing programs . . . encouraging work at
home; operating mid-day shuttles to local shopping areas; providing
'guaranteed [taxicab] rides home' to late workers; [and] establishing
more on-site amenities such as health clubs."'142 Employers can also
reduce the number of parking spaces in their lots or begin charging high
rates for parking, 43 thereby forcing a certain percentage of their
workforce to give up the single-passenger commute. This method,
although unpopular and likely to give the employer a "bad rap" among
employees, is highly effective in reducing the number of commuters.'"
Under the "employment at will" doctrine, 45 adopted in most states,
an employer also has the option of legally conditioning his employees'
continued employment with the company on their compliance with the
commuting program. Thus, employees who fail to comply would sim-
ply lose their jobs. Although this solution would certainly save the
employer the fines levied for noncompliance, 46 there are other substan-
tial costs involved in imposing such an ultimatum, especially in terms of
the larger-sized companies that section 751 la(d)(1)(B) targets.
Stated simply, for many employees it will be nearly impossible to
comply with such programs. For those living or working in suburban
areas, mass transit is often not an option. Further, car pools and van
pools may not be feasible for those employees with additional transpor-
tation needs beyond commuting to and from work. For example, many
employees run errands on their way to and from work, pick up a spouse
from work, or pick up children from day care. 147 Employees with disa-
142. Buss, supra note 59, at 8.
143. See, e.g., Jim Barlow, A Bad Solution for Our Pollution, HoUSTON CHRON., Jan. 20, 1994,
Business Section, at i.
144. Romano, supra note 51, at 34. However, this may lead to "conflicts with unions if
employers try to use collectively bargained [-for] paid parking as an incentive or disincentive."
Noble, supra note 67, at 25.
145. This state law doctrine, relating to an employment relationship for an indefinite term,
states that unless the employer and employee have contracted otherwise, either may terminate the
employment relationship for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. See, e.g., Chauvin v.
Tandy Corp., 984 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying Louisiana law); Solomon v. Walgreen
Co., 975 F.2d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Mississippi law); Forbus v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 958 F.2d 1036, 1041 (11 th Cir.) (applying Alabama law), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 412 (1992);
LaScola v. U.S. Sprint Communications, 946 F.2d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Illinois
law); Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying California law);
Warren v. Crawford, 927 F.2d 559, 562 (1 Ith Cir. 1991) (applying Georgia law); Smith v. Gould,
Inc., 918 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Nebraska law); Economu v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 829 F.2d 311, 317 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying Connecticut law).
146. See infra section VII.
147. See supra section V. Although some companies have placed stores, drycleaners, and
child care facilities on the workplace property so that employees can run errands without leaving
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bilities may find participation in a car pool or van pool to be particularly
difficult. Working odd shifts to escape the dictates of the statutory pro-
vision may not be feasible for parents of small children, and biking or
walking to work is not an option for those living a long distance from
the workplace.
Those employees who cannot comply with the employer's trip
reduction program when the employer conditions continued employment
on compliance will face the loss of their jobs. Imposition and enforce-
ment of such ultimatums may lower morale among the remaining
employees, and pose the danger of decreased productivity. 148
Employers risk facing additional costs by conditioning employment
on compliance with the trip reduction programs. For example, if the
employer terminates employees for failure to comply with the programs,
the employer may, in some instances, be liable for increased unemploy-
ment compensation insurance. 149 Moreover, if the labor pool in the area
surrounding the company is small, or if the terminated employees pos-
sess specialized skills, they may be expensive or impossible to replace.
Retraining new employees will also be time-consuming and costly in
such situations.
The trip reduction programs only require that the employer reduce
the APO of his commuting employees by 25%. This places the
employer in the difficult position of choosing which employees must
comply. Unless the employer is careful and fair in his choices, this, too,
may cause employee resentment. Overall, the employer control
demanded by the employer trip-reduction programs will result in costs
of lower workplace morale and productivity.
VII. EXCESSIVE COSTS OF COMPLIANCE
A final dual cause for concern is that section 751 la(d)(1)(B) of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 imposes real costs on the employer
that may be disproportionate to the employers' contribution to the air
the workplace, most companies don't have the resources to bring shopping areas closer to the
employees. Romano, supra note 51, at 34.
148. "Faced with the possibility of a layoff... many employees experience significant levels
of stress, sometimes to the point where their work performance deteriorates." This can create
"significant morale problems that can lead to loss of productivity and decreased work quality
.... .Gilmore, supra note 139, at 43.
149. For example, if an employee is fired because she is unable to work odd shifts or
participate in a carpool or van pool due to child care obligations, at least one state affected by the
employer trip-reduction requirement would allow the employee to recover unemployment




pollution problemi, 50 and the amount of pollution that will actually be
reduced as a result of this provision is questionable.151 According to one
source, "even perfect compliance with [the employer trip-reduction pro-
gram]'s requirements would reduce ozone pollution by only about 2 per-
cent."'152  And figures show that commuting accounts for only one
quarter of all vehicle trips, 153 so, perhaps the employer trip-reduction
programs-aimed only at commuters-are not the most cost-effective
solution to the problem.1 54
Employers will be required to pay high costs under the new provi-
sions whether they comply or fail to comply with them. The cost of
compliance itself promises to be substantial. "Officials estimate the pro-
gram could cost up to $192 million a year [in Washington, D.C.]. Most
of that money would be paid by individual employers."' 55 In Chicago,
estimates of compliance with section 751 la(d)(1)(B) of the Clean Air
Act start at $200 million per year;' 56 compliance in Connecticut is esti-
mated between $200 and $900 per employee annually.'5 7
The provision requires employers to "offer alternatives to tradi-
tional single-passenger commuting. Some of those alternatives would
be the purchase of vans and offering airline tickets, portable televisions
or cash as incentives for employees who walk or bike to work."' 58
Employers may also revise work schedules "to reduce the number of
trips" that employees take to and from work,1 59 or allow their employees
150. "[O]nly about 14 percent of the vehicle miles traveled during the morning rush hour is to
employers of 100 or more people." McBride, supra note 1, at 1.
151. "[S]uch plans will reduce air pollution anywhere from 5 percent to no gain at all."
Barlow, supra note 142, at 1. The employer trip-reduction programs will reduce air pollution only
slightly more than "requiring that water-based paint be used to stripe roads." Id. In California,
"most of the regulators who will enforce the new requirement are a bit pessimistic about how well
it will actually achieve cleaner air." Litvan, supra note 7, at 36.
152. Buss, supra note 56, at 3.
153. Commuting has fallen from 32 percent of all vehicle trips in 1969 to 26 percent in 1990.
Barlow, supra note 142, at 1.
154. " 'Only a small percentage of pollution comes from work-related travel. Even if we
achieve the [employer trip reduction program's] goal, it will have a negligible effect on air
quality.' " Molnar, supra note 130, at 1. One writer has predicted that the trip-reduction
programs will end up costing "thousands more dollars than other methods" of cleaning up the
environment. Barlow, supra note 142, Business Section, at 1. In addition, even an air pollution
control officer has stated that" 'This ... [is] the most costly and least-effective program available
to us.' " Steve LaRue, Tough EPA Smog Plan Advances, Reluctantly, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Dec. 8, 1993, at BI.
155. Naylor, supra note 50, at C4.
156. lbata, supra note 125, at DI.
157. McBride, supra note 1, at 1.
158. Ted Gregory, Businesses Rally, Seek Upgrade of Area's Clean-Air Classification, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 18, 1993, at 5.
159. Litvan, supra note 7, at 36.
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to "telecommute."' 6 ° All of these alternatives amount to costly proposi-
tions for employers' 6 '-the cost per employee can range from $107 to
$700 per year in the Chicago metropolitan area, 62 and in the Baltimore
area, costs are expected to be up to $1000 per employee per year. 163
Employees under the program would be urged to car-pool or use
mass transit. But in places where that's not practical, or for employ-
ees who work odd hours, much of the [financial] burden would be
placed on employers. They would have to offer van pools, shortened
workweeks, and "guaranteed rides home" to late workers in some
instances. '
Many employers also complain about the cost of the paperwork and
bookkeeping the new legislation requires. 165 In addition, the costs of
hiring an employee to manage the trip-reduction program and of making
periodic checks to ensure that employees are complying with the pro-
gram, are borne completely by the employer. Some states, such as New
Jersey, even require each plan and update submitted by employers to
include a fee, ranging from $200 to $1600.166 Of course, the high costs
of compliance will be felt most severely by the smaller companies (100-
200 employees) affected by the trip-reduction provision.
"Some business executives also fear that the federal mandate could
force some firms to relocate out of the [affected] region an discourage
others from moving in."167 The loss of these businesses would result in
costs not only to other businesses in the area, but to the surrounding
community as well.
Even though compliance costs are high, not complying will prove
even more expensive. Section 7511 d(a) of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990168 provides for enforcement measures against those
employers failing to comply with the mandatory trip-reduction pro-
grams.' 69 If employers can't get their employees to begin complying by
November 1996, companies could face possible criminal penalties and
160. See, e.g., Molnar, supra note 13 1, at 1.
161. For example, many employers have complained that revising work schedules can actually
reduce production, which in turn increases employer costs. Litvan, supra note 7, at 36.
162. Gregory, supra note 158.
163. Reinert, supra note 1, at 3.
164. Naylor, supra note 50, at C4.
165. Reinhold, supra note 126, at Al.
166. Schneider & Wilson, supra note 1, at 16.
167. Ibata, supra note 52, at 1.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 7511d(a) (1990).
169. The section states that:
Each implementation plan revision required under section 7511 a(d) ... of this title
... shall provide that, if the area to which such plan revision applies has failed to
attain the national primary ambient air quality standard for ozone by the applicable
attainment date, each [such employer] shall.., pay a fee to the State as a penalty for
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fines ranging up to $25,000 a day.' 7° However, there is a loophole-
[i]f the employer spends an amount equal to the cost of providing
each employee a parking space at the workplace and does not achieve
the required increase in ridership but shows that such an increase is
not feasible, the requirement of the bill will be considered to have
been met. 7 '
Some argue that there are more efficient ways to clean the air and
that perhaps the burden should be shifted to commuters, rather than
employers. 172 "The Clean Air Act sets out to lower [the number of com-
muters] to reduce the pollution created by cars. But critics of the legisla-
tion say that the lack of suburban mass transit makes achieving the goals
difficult, if not impossible, and puts an unfair burden on suburban
employers and commuters."' 73 The employer trip-reduction programs
will not enhance mobility, and the costs borne by employers will be too
great.
VIII. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Largely because of the above-mentioned problems with the
employer trip-reduction mandate, in the one instance prior to November
1994 where this plan was put into action, the program did not work. Los
Angeles, California implemented the plan earlier than required' 74 and
was to serve as a "model for the anti-air pollution battle" in other
states.175 However, "after five years of trying, and despite threats of
fines of up to $50,000 a day against companies that refuse to cooperate,
Los Angeles' chief air quality officer acknowledges that the campaign to
get more people to stop driving hasn't produced the hoped-for
results."' 76 Explanations for the failure of the California program are
many-the program "costs too much for the air quality benefits it pro-
such failure... for each calendar year beginning after the attainment date, until the
area is redesignated as an attainment area for ozone.
42 U.S.C. § 751 ld(a) (1990). Section 751 ld(b) goes on to state that the fee shall be $5,000, but
will be subject to some adjustments. 42 U.S.C. § 7511d(b) (1990).
170. Fines for noncompliance in Wisconsin could reach as high as $25,000 per day. Buss,
supra note 59, at 8. Failure to comply in Texas would mean state fines starting at $10,000 per
day. Liebrum, supra note 59, at A25. In Illinois a noncomplying employer would be fined
between $1000 and $10,000 per day. Spencer, supra note 63, at 1.
171. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 5, at 32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3418. Of course,
this begs the questions of how to determine what a parking space costs and how to show that an
increase in ridership is not possible.
172. Randall Lane, The Commuter Police, FORBEs, Dec. 20, 1993, at 239.
173. Spencer, supra note 63, at 1.
174. Litvan, supra note 7, at 36.
175. David Ibata, "Model" Smog-Busting Plan Flops; Local Firms Buck U.S. Law as Clean
Air Deadline Nears, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 1994, News Section, at 1.
176. Id.
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duces,"'1 7 7 "it often ties up too much manpower,"' 17 and "it is a very
difficult, paper-heavy process."' 179
However, there are simple market-based solutions to the problem of
air pollution caused by the number of motor vehicles on the roads,
including increasing gasoline taxes 180 or requiring "high-priced tax
stickers for driving at certain congested hours."'18' The money raised
through such programs could be earmarked to improve mass transit sys-
tems so that they could serve a wider range of geographical areas.
Because of the increased costs associated with driving, employees would
voluntarily drive less frequently to work, thus eliminating employee
feelings of loss of personal freedom. In the same vein, employers would
no longer assert control over their employees' driving habits, which in
turn could eradicate morale problems created by mandatory trip reduc-
tion. And by removing employer control from the picture, the employer
would no longer face risks of liability for employee commuting acci-
dents. Another benefit to such programs is that they would decrease
driving across the board, and would not merely curb commuter air pol-.
lution problems.I82
Yet another plausible alternative to the employer trip-reduction pro-
grams is rewarding voluntary compliance with clean air standards with
corporate tax credits. However, this solution would again limit the
scope of the clean-up to employers only.
These proposed solutions would be much easier to manage because
they would require involving a much smaller number of people in
administration. Companies would not need to hire additional employees
to run trip-reduction programs, and the government would not need to
hire as many employees to ensure compliance. Furthermore, these sug-
gestions would be much less costly. The salaries of the employees hired
to police the programs, mentioned above, would be eliminated. Also,
the first two suggestions would actively generate money to improve the
mass transit systems. The employer trip-reduction program scheme, in
contrast, only provides federal money to improve mass transit in the




180. Stephen F. John & Douglas N. Kane, Getting Serious About Auto Pollution, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 9, 1993, at 15; see also Barlow, supra note 142, at 1.
181. Barlow, supra note 143, at 1.
182. In California, General Accounting Office researchers "suggested that market-based
disincentives that touch all drivers, not just employees of certain-size companies-such as an
increase in the gasoline tax-might be more effective in helping to reduce emissions." Litvan,
supra note 7, at 36.
183. See S. REP. No. 228, supra note 5, at 26, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3412.
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These proposed solutions may actually improve the diversity in
many suburban companies as well. By actively improving mass transit
and the areas it reaches, poorer inner-city workers may be able to com-
mute to suburban companies that may offer higher salaries and more
potential. 184
Through the use of an increased tax levied on either gasoline itself
or on drivers driving during congested hours, or even by awarding cor-
porations tax credits for voluntary compliance, "people's behavior and
attitudes toward driving""' can be modified in a less intrusive manner.
Although politicians may be reluctant to pass tough measures such as
stiff tax increases,18 6 the air pollution problem in the United States calls
for solutions that work, regardless of the possible political repercussions.
These proposals, used instead of the employer trip-reduction programs
would, in the long run, lead to better overall results in cleaning up this
country's air pollution problem.
IX. CONCLUSION
Section 751 la(d)(1)(B) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
has the potential to increase dramatically employer responsibility, liabil-
ity, and costs, and to infringe upon employees' freedom of mobility.
The Amendments set out as their purpose not only to decrease VMTs,
but also to enhance mobility-and to meet both goals at an acceptable
cost. But the decrease in VMTs won't come as easily as Congress had
planned. Mobility is not enhanced by requiring individuals with differ-
ent personal schedules to ride mass transit or car pool to work each day.
Moreover, it is questionable whether the cost of the program is "accepta-
ble" in light of the large number of actual and potential increased costs
borne by employers. If the plan causes large corporations to move from
severe or extreme nonattainment areas into attainment areas, the whole
cycle will start anew elsewhere. In the meantime, communities will lose
valuable sources of income and many workers will lose their jobs.
The proposed solutions of a simple increase in the gasoline tax, a
required tax for driving during congested hours, or a corporate tax credit
awarded for voluntary compliance, are much simpler, cheaper, and more
effective methods for combating the pervasive air pollution problem
plaguing our larger cities. Section 751 la(d)(1)(b) of the Clean Air Act
has already been put to the test and has failed to produce the desired
results. Perhaps now is the time to experiment with alternative solu-
184. See generally E. Douglass Williams & Richard H. Sander, Prospects for Putting America
to Work in the Inner City, 81 GEORGETOWN L.J. Ass'N 2003 (1993).
185. Molnar, supra note 131, at 1.
186. Barlow, supra note 143, at 1.
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tions, before the employer trip-reduction programs become an accepted
part of the costs to American businesses.
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